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In its ﬁrst full Term with its newest member, the U.S. Supreme
Court marched decidedly to the right with decisions narrowing
abortion rights, striking down afﬁrmative action programs, invalidating campaign ﬁnance regulations, and making it more difﬁcult
for victims of employment discrimination to seek redress. In the
face of this rightward shift the most surprising decision of the Term
was the Court’s embrace of claims that the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) had acted unlawfully by refusing to use
the Clean Air Act to combat climate change. In Massachusetts v EPA,1
the Court held that EPA had the authority to regulate emissions
of greenhouse gases from motor vehicles under the Clean Air Act,
and it ordered the agency to reconsider its refusal to do so.
The Court’s decision vividly illustrates important features of its
approach to regulatory issues today. The Court decided the case
by a 5–4 margin, with Justices in the majority and dissent sharply
Robert V. Percival is the Robert F. Stanton Professor of Law and the Director of the
Environmental Law Program at the University of Maryland School of Law.
Author’s note: I would like to thank the members of the Georgetown Environmental
Research Workshop, including Lisa Heinzerling, E. Donald Elliott, Richard Lazarus, and
John Echeverria, for valuable comments on a previous draft of this article. I also would
like to thank Maryland law students Gaddiel Baah, Julie Grufferman, and Elaine Lutz for
research assistance.
1

127 S Ct 1438 (2007).

䉷 2008 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
978-0-226-36252-6/2008/2007-0003$10.00
111

112

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[2007

disagreeing with each other on issues of constitutional law, statutory
interpretation, and administrative law. As in each of the other
twenty-three cases the Court decided by a single vote during this
Term, Justice Kennedy cast the deciding vote. The ultimate lineup
of the other eight Justices was entirely predictable. Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Kennedy in siding with the
environmental plaintiffs, while Justices Scalia, Thomas, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Alito voted to uphold the agency’s refusal
to act.
At ﬁrst glance Massachusetts v EPA may seem to be a surprising
green turn by the Court (one scholar called it “as close as we will
come” to a “Brown v. Board of Education for the environment”2).
Environmental advocates hope it will spawn regulatory action to
combat climate change; some anticipate a new ﬂood of lawsuits
against major sources of greenhouse gas emissions. While the decision is a profoundly important victory for environmentalists, lurking beneath its surface is a harsh reality: the decision conﬁrms that
the Justices are even more sharply split over foundational principles
of the regulatory state than they were before the addition of the
Court’s two newest members.
Four Justices highly skeptical of environmental regulation narrowly construe regulatory statutes and seek to restrict citizen access
to the courts to implement and enforce federal regulatory programs.
Four other Justices are decidedly more sympathetic to the broad
purposes of the environmental laws and the citizen suit provisions
incorporated into them. Justice Kennedy is the man in the middle—
skeptical of regulation, but open to accommodating the orderly
evolution of the modern regulatory state.
The struggle between these two camps echoes centuries-old tensions between the common law’s skepticism of regulatory interventions by government and the civil law’s greater tolerance for
them. These tensions were most evident when U.S. courts heard
early challenges to the New Deal’s regulatory programs. Despite
the rise of the modern regulatory state, these tensions frequently
resurface as courts review regulatory decisions by administrative
agencies. After describing this emerging pattern, this article examines how it is reﬂected in the sharp divisions between the majority
and dissenting opinions in Massachusetts v EPA. It then discusses
2
Jonathan Z. Cannon, The Signiﬁcance of Massachusetts v. EPA, Va L Rev In Brief 53
(May 21, 2007), online at http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/05/21/cannon.pdf.
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the implications of this decision for the struggle to overcome barriers to global, collective action to respond to climate change.
I. The Growing Shadow of the Common Law on Judicial
Review of Regulatory Decisions
Before examining the Court’s decision in Massachusetts v
EPA, it is important ﬁrst to consider how the Court has evolved in
its treatment of challenges to regulatory decisions. Prior to the
enactment of comprehensive federal regulatory statutes, the common law of nuisance was the ﬁrst line of legal defense for the
environment. In the early decades of the twentieth century, the
Supreme Court itself heard many prominent disputes between states
over transboundary air and water pollution.3 When massive pollution from large sources, such as copper smelters, caused visible
environmental harm, it was possible for plaintiffs to satisfy the common law’s demands for individualized proof of causal injury. The
U.S. Supreme Court issued injunctions to control pollution in several cases, though it did not relish performing the role of a national
regulatory agency. The common law helped encourage noxious activities to locate away from populated areas, and it spurred the
development of new technology to control pollution.
During the 1970s Congress enacted comprehensive regulatory
legislation to protect the environment. The regulatory programs
these new laws erected were designed to overcome the inadequacies
of the common law in combating chronic, multisource pollution
problems by giving expert administrative agencies the authority to
adopt preventive regulations. Emphasizing the comprehensive nature of the regulatory scheme established by the Clean Water Act,
the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted this law to supplant the federal
common law of interstate nuisance.4
Courts reviewing the ﬁrst generation of regulations implementing these programs confronted claims by regulated entities that
agencies had adopted excessively burdensome regulations that
would do little to protect human health and the environment. Responding to such claims, a plurality of the Supreme Court in 1980
invalidated an Occupational Safety and Health Administration
3
See Robert V. Percival, The Clean Water Act and the Demise of the Federal Common Law
of Interstate Nuisance, 55 Ala L Rev 717, 717 n 4 (2004).
4
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(OSHA) regulation to protect workers against exposure to benzene.5
By creative interpretation of a deﬁnitional provision in the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act, the plurality imposed new
preconditions on agency issuance of regulations. OSHA was directed to perform a risk assessment to determine if current levels
of workplace exposure to benzene posed a “signiﬁcant risk” and to
ascertain that such a risk could be appreciably reduced by regulation.
For a plurality decision interpreting a single statute, Benzene had a
surprisingly large impact as agencies operating under a plethora of
regulatory authorities routinely began to conduct risk assessments.
However, the Court quickly signaled that it would not hamstring
preventive regulation when it rejected industry efforts to write a
cost-beneﬁt analysis requirement into the OSH Act.6
Despite Benzene, reviewing courts generally were not hostile to
the ﬁrst generation of federal environmental, health, and safety
regulations. Three years after Benzene, the Court’s Chevron decision7
directed reviewing courts to give greater deference to reasonable
agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions. While
Chevron (and Vermont Yankee8—a decision giving agencies more procedural freedom) reversed victories by environmental groups in the
Courts of Appeals, the Supreme Court was not on a mission to tilt
judicial review in an antiregulatory direction. This was conﬁrmed
by its State Farm decision9 where the Court required the National
Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) to reconsider its decision to rescind a regulation requiring motor vehicles
to employ passive restraints to reduce deaths in auto accidents.
A key feature of the new regulatory legislation was its authorization for citizen suits to enforce regulations and to require agencies
to perform nondiscretionary duties. The courts facilitated such actions by recognizing that aesthetic injury could give rise to standing
to sue by environmental interests. While disappointing environmentalists by rejecting the Sierra Club’s efforts to establish auto5
Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v American Petroleum Institute, 448 US 607
(1980) (“Benzene”).
6

American Textile Manufacturers Institute v Donovan, 452 US 490 (1981).

7

Chevron, USA v Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 US 837 (1984).

8

In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 US 519
(1978), the Court directed lower courts not to impose additional procedural requirements
on agencies that go beyond requirements contained in the underlying regulatory statute.
9
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v State Farm Mutual Auto. Insur. Co., 463 US 29
(1983).
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matic standing, the Supreme Court’s decision in Sierra Club v Morton10 established that allegations of aesthetic injury could give rise
to standing and that “the fact that particular environmental interests
are shared by the many rather than the few does not make them
less deserving of legal protection through the judicial process.”11
The following year the Court upheld the standing of a student
group to challenge a railroad tariff that allegedly would reduce the
market for recycled materials in United States v Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP).12 The Court reiterated not
only that aesthetic and environmental harm could give rise to standing, but also that “standing is not to be denied simply because many
people suffer the same injury.”13 As Justice Stewart explained in his
opinion for the Court: “To deny standing to persons who are in
fact injured simply because many others are also injured, would
mean that the most injurious and widespread Government actions
could be questioned by nobody. We cannot accept that conclusion.”14
While the Supreme Court generally was not viewed as a champion of environmental interests when it was under the leadership
of Chief Justice Burger, in a number of decisions it did not hesitate
to read the new federal regulatory statutes broadly. This is illustrated
by the Court’s landmark 1978 “snail darter” decision interpreting
the Endangered Species Act15 and its unanimous 1985 decision upholding regulations applying the Clean Water Act to wetlands adjacent to navigable waters.16 In addition to broadly interpreting the
scope of federal regulatory authority to achieve the ambitious goals
of the Acts, the Court emphasized the importance of deferring to
agency expertise. Thus in Riverside Bayview, Justice White writing
for a unanimous Court stated:
In view of the breadth of federal regulatory authority contemplated by the Act itself and the inherent difﬁculties of deﬁning
precise bounds to regulable waters, the Corps’ ecological judg10

405 US 727 (1972).

11

Id at 734.
412 US 669 (1973).

12
13

Id at 687.

14

Id at 688.

15

Tennessee Valley Authority v Hill, 437 US 153 (1978).

16

United States v Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 US 121 (1985).
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ment about the relationship between waters and their adjacent
wetlands provides an adequate basis for a legal judgment that
adjacent wetlands may be deﬁned as waters under the Act.17

The Court today is sharply split on its approach to review of
environmental regulations. After William Rehnquist became Chief
Justice and Antonin Scalia joined the Court in 1986, the Court
became more solicitous of private property rights and more skeptical
about environmental standing. In each area of law, the Justices
championing this shift reimported common law principles to judicial review of regulatory decisions. In a law review article written
three years before he joined the Court,18 Justice Scalia boldly revealed his antipathy to environmental standing based on his ideological distaste for strict implementation of the environmental laws.
In 1992, he authored both the Court’s most restrictive environmental standing decision (Lujan)19 and a landmark property rights
decision (Lucas).20 In the former Justice Scalia questioned the constitutional authority of Congress to authorize certain citizen suits,
while in the latter he dismissed state legislative ﬁndings concerning
what activities pose a danger to public health and the environment.
Elevating common law principles to constitutional status, he declared in Lucas that regulations that deprive real property of all
economically viable use require payment of just compensation unless they proscribe only activities that would be nuisances prohibited
at common law. Justice Scalia insisted in Lucas that legislative ﬁndings that regulation is necessary to prevent environmental harm are
insufﬁcient in themselves to preclude takings liability. Instead the
Court held that only regulations forbidding activities that were common law nuisances at the time the Constitution was adopted could
qualify for the nuisance exception to takings liability. Signaling his
openness to a more ﬂexible approach to applying common law
notions, Justice Kennedy in a concurring opinion expressed his
discomfort with Justice Scalia’s approach. Justice Kennedy concluded that “nuisance prevention” is not the “sole source of state
authority to impose severe restrictions” given the state’s interest in
17

Id at 134.
Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 Suffolk U L Rev 881 (1983).
18

19

Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555 (1992).

20

Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003 (1992).
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“enacting new regulatory initiatives in response to changing conditions . . . .”21
In another property rights case decided two years later, the Court
limited the ability of government authorities to seek regulatory
exactions from developers. It required that the government demonstrate not only an “essential nexus” between the state interest
and nature of the exaction,22 but also that the magnitude of the
exaction is “roughly proportional” to the impact of the development.23 In similar fashion, the Court in City of Boerne v Flores 24
considerably limited the remedial powers Congress may exercise
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment by requiring that
it show “congruence and proportionality” between its legislative
goals and the prevention of actual violations of Fourteenth Amendment rights. In each of these cases, the Court constructed its own
type of common law demonstration of injury that the government
must satisfy before its regulatory action can be upheld.
While the Burger Court’s environmental decisions did not feature
ideologically predictable coalitions of Justices on either side, the
Rehnquist Court’s decisions were a different matter, particularly
after the Court embarked on its campaigns to revive constitutional
limits on federal power, to vindicate state sovereignty, and to
strengthen constitutional protection for property rights. Most of
these cases were decided by a stable coalition of ﬁve Justices over
strident dissents by the other four members of the Court. Prominent
features of these decisions included the majority’s profound distrust
of legislative ﬁndings of harm and its insistence on more demanding
demonstrations of causal connections between regulated activities
and the harm the regulation seeks to prevent.
For example, in United States v Lopez25 the Court held by a 5–4
majority that the Commerce Clause did not give Congress the authority to prohibit the possession of ﬁrearms in the vicinity of
schools because the statute at issue regulated an activity that did
not “substantially affect” interstate commerce. The ﬁve-Justice majority in Lopez emphasized that Congress had not made factual
21

Id at 1035 (Kennedy concurring).

22

This requirement was ﬁrst established in Nollan v California Coastal Commission, 483
US 825 (1987).
23

Dolan v City of Tigard, 512 US 374 (1994).

24

521 US 507 (1997).

25

514 US 549 (1995).
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ﬁndings concerning the impact of ﬁrearm possession near schools
on interstate commerce. However, ﬁve years later in United States
v Morrison26 it invalidated legislation creating a federal civil cause
of action for victims of gender-motivated violence, despite the fact
that Congress had made extensive ﬁndings concerning the substantial impact of such violence on interstate commerce.
Even when the Rehnquist Court rebuffed efforts to narrow the
scope of the environmental laws through judicial interpretation,
some Justices sought to fashion implied common law limits on their
application. In Babbitt v Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Great Oregon27 the Court reversed a lower court’s interpretation of
the Endangered Species Act that limited its prohibition on “taking”
endangered species to embrace only the direct physical application
of force. The Court upheld regulations that also barred the destruction of the species’ critical habitat if it caused harm to their
members. Justice O’Connor wrote a separate concurring opinion
arguing that common law principles of proximate cause necessarily
limit application of this provision.28
Both Justice O’Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist abandoned
Justice Scalia’s campaign to restrict environmental standing in 2000
when they joined ﬁve other Justices in upholding the standing of
citizens living near a company that repeatedly violated the Clean
Water Act to sue to enforce permit limits.29 The decision emphasized that plaintiffs need not demonstrate that the permit violations
had caused actual harm to the environment, but rather only that
they caused the plaintiffs to have reasonable concerns about the
impact of the violations. The following year the Court unanimously
upheld the constitutionality of the Clean Air Act, rejecting an industry challenge premised on the long dormant nondelegation doctrine.30
While rebufﬁng most constitutional challenges to environmental
regulation, the Rehnquist Court cited constitutional concerns in
construing the scope of the environmental laws more narrowly. In
2001, the Court in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC) held that the Clean Water
26

529 US 598 (2000).

27

515 US 687 (1995).

28

Id at 708–09.

29

Friends of the Earth v Laidlaw Environmental Services, 528 US 167 (2000).

30

Whitman v American Trucking Associations, 531 US 457 (2001).
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Act did not authorize the regulation of dredge and ﬁll activities in
isolated wetlands.31 The Court’s 5– 4 majority declined to reach the
constitutional issue because it found that Congress had not intended
to allow the Corps to regulate isolated wetlands. Stating that it
expected a clear statement of Congressional intent to support “an
administrative interpretation of a statute [that] invokes the outer
limits of Congress’ power,”32 the Court majority concluded that
regulation of isolated wetlands exceeded the Corps’ authority under
the Act.33
The sharp division in the Court concerning the scope of the
Clean Water Act was further illustrated the next year when the
Court split 4–4 in a wetlands case in which Justice Kennedy had
recused himself.34 But it was only after Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
death and the conﬁrmation of Chief Justice Roberts that the full
dimensions of the Court’s divisions became most apparent. In 2006
the Court split 4–1–4 in deciding whether the Clean Water Act
could be applied to wetlands adjacent to nonnavigable tributaries
of navigable waters.35
In an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, a plurality of four
Justices (including Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito) endorsed a radically restrictive interpretation of “waters
of the United States” that would have signiﬁcantly narrowed the
scope of federal jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act had it commanded a majority of the Court.36 While rejecting the petitioners’
argument that the Act applies only to waters navigable in fact or
susceptible of being so rendered, the plurality relied on a 1954
dictionary deﬁnition of “waters” to conclude that it includes “only
relatively permanent, standing or ﬂowing bodies of water.”37 Addressing the difﬁculty of squaring this conclusion with the Court’s
unanimous holding in Riverside Bayview, the plurality creatively explained “Riverside Bayview rested upon the inherent ambiguity in
31
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 US 159
(2001).
32

Id at 172.

33

Id at 174.

34

Borden Ranch Partnership v U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 261 F3d 810 (9th Cir 2001),
aff ’d by an equally divided Court, 537 US 99 (2002).
35

Rapanos v United States, 126 S Ct 2208 (2006).

36

Id.
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Id at 2220–21.
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deﬁning where water ends and abutting (‘adjacent’) wetlands begin,
permitting the Corps’ reliance on ecological considerations only to
resolve that ambiguity in favor of treating all abutting wetlands as
waters.”38
In an opinion authored by Justice Stevens, four dissenting Justices
(including Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) argued that federal Clean Water Act jurisdiction extends to wetlands adjacent to
nonnavigable tributaries of navigable waters. They argued that the
case was squarely controlled by the Court’s unanimous decision in
Riverside Bayview and that contrary interpretations were inconsistent
with the legislative history and purposes of the Clean Water Act.
The Army Corps has determined that wetlands adjacent to tributaries of traditionally navigable waters preserve the quality of
our Nation’s waters by, among other things, providing habitat
for aquatic animals, keeping excessive sediment and toxic pollutants out of adjacent waters, and reducing downstream ﬂooding
by absorbing water at times of high ﬂow. The Corps’ resulting
decision to treat these wetlands as encompassed within the term
“waters of the United States” is a quintessential example of the
Executive’s reasonable interpretation of a statutory provision.39

Neither of these opinions commanded a majority of the Court
because the decisive ninth vote was cast by Justice Kennedy who
wrote an opinion concurring only in the judgment that the decision
below should be reversed and the case remanded to the lower court.
Justice Kennedy sharply rejected the radical narrowing of the Act
advocated in the Scalia plurality opinion, and he acknowledged the
importance of broadly protecting wetlands. While he agreed with
much of the dissent, he supported a remand because he wanted the
court below to apply a new standard he articulated in his concurrence. Justice Kennedy concluded that “to constitute ‘navigable waters’ under the Act, a water or wetland must possess a ‘signiﬁcant
nexus’ to waters that are or were navigable in fact or that could
reasonably be so made.”40 Thus, in Justice Kennedy’s view, to successfully assert federal jurisdiction under the Act the government
must show that “the wetlands, either alone or in combination with
similarly situated lands in the region, signiﬁcantly affect the chem38

Id at 2226 (emphasis in original).

39

Id at 2252 (Stevens dissenting).

40

Id at 2236 (Kennedy concurring in the judgment).
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ical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters more
readily understood as ‘navigable.’”41 He noted that if the effects are
only “speculative or insubstantial” the wetlands will not be subject
to federal jurisdiction, but he concluded that a “reasonable inference
of ecologic interconnection” can be drawn for wetlands adjacent to
navigable waters.
Because he cast the decisive vote in the case, Justice Kennedy’s
view of the applicable law now appears to be controlling even
though it was rejected by all eight of the other Justices. Justice
Kennedy himself emphatically rejected the view of the four-Justice
plurality opinion authored by Justice Scalia. He argued that the
limitations it seeks to impose on federal jurisdiction “are without
support in the language and purposes of the Act or in our cases
interpreting it.”42 He explained that the “plurality’s ﬁrst requirement—permanent standing water or continuous ﬂow, at least for a
period of ‘some months’—makes little practical sense in a statute
concerned with downstream water quality”43 and has no support in
the statutory text even when dictionary deﬁnitions of “waters” are
applied. Justice Kennedy argued that “exclusion of wetlands lacking
a continuous surface connection to other jurisdictional waters—is
also unpersuasive” because wetlands are not “‘indistinguishable’ from
waters to which they bear a surface connection.”44 Thus, he concluded that “the plurality’s opinion is inconsistent with the Act’s
text, structure, and purpose.”45
Justice Kennedy and the four dissenting Justices also rejected the
plurality’s notion that federal jurisdiction should be interpreted narrowly to avoid constitutional concerns. Justice Kennedy noted that
thirty-three states and the District of Columbia ﬁled an amicus
brief supporting a broad interpretation of federal jurisdiction because it “protects downstream States from out-of-state pollution
that they cannot themselves regulate.”46
Addressing the administrative difﬁculties of applying his “substantial nexus” approach to deﬁning federal jurisdiction, Justice
Kennedy suggested that:
41
42

Id at 2248.
Id at 2242.

43

Id (citation omitted).

44

Id at 2244.

45

Id at 2246.

46

Id.
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[t]hrough regulations or adjudication, the Corps may choose to
identify categories of tributaries that, due to their volume of ﬂow
(either annually or on average), their proximity to navigable waters, or other relevant considerations, are signiﬁcant enough that
wetlands adjacent to them are likely, in the majority of cases, to
perform important functions for an aquatic system incorporating
navigable waters.47

For wetlands adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters, Justice Kennedy
concluded that adjacency can be sufﬁcient for the Corps to establish
jurisdiction. “Absent more speciﬁc regulations, however, the Corps
must establish a signiﬁcant nexus on a case-by-case basis when it
seeks to regulate wetlands based on adjacency to nonnavigable tributaries.”48 Justice Kennedy states that “[w]here an adequate nexus
is established for a particular wetland, it may be permissible, as a
matter of administrative convenience or necessity, to presume covered status for other comparable wetlands in the region.”49
For now, the end product of Rapanos is that the scope of federal
jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act is hopelessly confused. In
an unusual concurring opinion, Chief Justice Roberts described the
result of the 4–1–4 split as “unfortunate” because “no opinion commands a majority of the Court on precisely how to read Congress’
limits on the reach of the Clean Water Act.”50 As a result, he noted,
“Lower courts and regulated entities will now have to feel their way
on a case-by-case basis.”51 Surprisingly, he suggested that the situation “readily . . . could have been avoided” if the Army Corps
of Engineers had issued new regulations after SWANCC clarifying
the limits of its jurisdictional reach. Citing Chevron, the Chief Justice
noted “Given the broad, somewhat ambiguous, but nonetheless
clearly limiting terms Congress employed in the Clean Water Act,
the Corps and the EPA would have enjoyed plenty of room to
operate in developing some notion of an outer bound to the reach
of their authority.”52 Yet because the Chief Justice joined in full
Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion, which rejected any deference to a
broader deﬁnition of “waters of the United States” than the one
47
48

Id at 2248.
Id at 2249.

49

Id.

50

Id at 2236 (Roberts concurring).

51

Id.

52

Id.
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articulated by Justice Scalia, the Chief Justice’s concurrence contributes further to the confusion.
While purporting to interpret Congressional intent, the opinions
of the Justices in Rapanos reﬂect the more fundamental split that
permeates much of the Court’s jurisprudence in reviewing regulatory decisions by administrative agencies.53 Four Justices ( Justices
Scalia, Thomas, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Alito) join an
opinion expressing extreme hostility to a long-standing regulatory
interpretation (referring to it as a thirty-year-old “entrenched executive error” and stating that it “would authorize the Corps to
function as a de facto regulator of immense stretches of intrastate
land—an authority the agency has shown its willingness to exercise
with the scope of discretion that would beﬁt a local zoning board”).54
Four other Justices ( Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer)
vote to uphold the regulation because they are willing to defer to
the judgment of a federal agency that it is essential to achieving
the Congressional purpose. The Justice in the middle—Justice Kennedy—acknowledges the importance of the regulatory goal while
seeking to impose new procedural requirements on the agency to
avoid overreaching.
Justice Scalia’s group of Justices made highly exaggerated claims
that § 404 imposes high costs on landowners while appearing dismissive of the ecological costs of ﬁlling wetlands. Justice Kennedy
correctly calls Scalia’s opinion “unduly dismissive” of the
“[i]mportant public interests . . . served by the Clean Water Act
in general and by the protection of wetlands in particular.”55 In a
footnote Justice Stevens criticizes the plurality’s “antagonism to
environmentalism” and its claim that his dissent is “policy-laden”
by observing that “[t]he policy considerations that have inﬂuenced
my thinking are Congress’ rather than my own.”56 This debate
illustrates the sharply contrasting views concerning the value of
federal regulatory programs to protect the environment among the
Justices currently on the Court.
While four Justices readily accept the importance of legislation
53
For a more detailed discussion contrasting the precautionary and reactive approaches
to environmental regulation embraced by different members of the judiciary, see Robert
V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Twenty-First Century, 25 Va Envir L J 1, 9–18 (2007).
54

Rapanos, 126 S Ct at 2232, 2224 (Scalia plurality opinion).

55

Id at 2246 (Kennedy concurring in the judgment).

56

Id at 2259 n 8 (Stevens dissenting).
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authorizing precautionary regulation, four others are reluctant to
accept legislative ﬁndings to justify regulation and narrowly construe the scope and purposes of federal regulatory programs to
protect the environment, even though the comprehensiveness of
these programs was the Court’s initial rationale for supplanting the
federal common law of nuisance. Four Justices (Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito) insist on more demanding, and more individualized, factual showings of causal connections before federal regulations are upheld or enforced, while
four other Justices (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) are more
tolerant of regulatory decisions founded on assessments of risk at
the wholesale level.
This split reﬂects fundamental differences in the Justices’ attitudes toward precautionary regulation. One group of Justices (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) is inclined to interpret the
environmental statutes to facilitate achievement of their precautionary purposes by upholding regulation of activities believed to
contribute to environmental harm. Another group of Justices
(Scalia, Thomas, C. J. Roberts, and Alito) is profoundly skeptical
of precautionary regulation and concerned about its cost and fairness. Even though regulatory legislation was adopted in response
to the perceived inadequacies of the common law (particularly its
demand for individualized proof of causal injury), these Justices
insist on a kind of common law standard of proof connecting activities to be regulated with demonstrated environmental harm.
This split permeates a wide range of decisions concerning who has
standing to sue in environmental cases, the scope of federal regulatory authority, and even what constitutes a regulatory taking.
Justice Kennedy straddles both camps. He demands a greater
showing of causal injury to justify regulation than the more precautionary group of Justices, but he also recognizes that “[t]he common law of nuisance is too narrow a conﬁne for the exercise of
regulatory power in a complex and interdependent society.”57 While
Justices Scalia and Thomas seek to keep environmental plaintiffs
out of court on constitutional grounds, questioning whether citizen
suits violate separation of powers principles, Justice Kennedy opines
that the purchase of a plane ticket to visit foreign endangered species
would have been enough to give an environmental group standing
57
Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Commission, 505 US 1003, 1035 (1992) (Kennedy concurring in the judgment).
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in Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife.58 While rejecting Justice Scalia’s
disdainfully narrow interpretation of the scope of the Clean Water
Act in Rapanos v United States,59 Justice Kennedy still insists on the
government showing a “signiﬁcant nexus” between wetlands it seeks
to regulate and navigable waters. This produced the 4 –1– 4 split in
Rapanos that has caused enormous confusion concerning the scope
of federal authority under the Clean Water Act because Justice
Kennedy’s view of the applicable law now appears to be controlling
even though it was rejected by all eight of the other Justices.
The Rapanos decision starkly highlights the differences between
a precautionary approach to regulatory policy and a reactive one.
The four Justices who voted to uphold federal regulation in the
case were willing to defer to the judgment of a federal agency that
it is essential to regulate wetlands adjacent to tributaries of navigable
waters in order to prevent degradation of water quality. The four
Justices who voted against the government were skeptical that such
regulation would prevent ecological harm, but also fearful that this
approach would allow federal agencies to regulate virtually anything. The inﬂuence of common law notions of causation is apparent in Justice Kennedy’s approach, which acknowledges the importance of precautionary regulation, while insisting on some
factual demonstration that regulated activities are connected to substantial environmental harm. No decision highlights so sharply the
differences between the Justices in their approaches to judicial review of environmental regulations than Rapanos.
The sharp split between the Justices in their attitudes toward
regulatory policy is strikingly similar to centuries-old debates between common law and civil law approaches to protection of public
health, as Professor Noga Morag-Levine has demonstrated.60 Her
research traces the evolution of judicial hostility in England toward
continental Europe’s “civil law model” that “relied on centralized,
agency-based, state administration aimed at the implementation of
regulatory standards through expert legislators and bureaucrats.”61
By contrast, the “common law model fundamentally distrusted bu58
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reaucratic administration, and as a consequence, identiﬁed courts
as the proper locus of administrative governance.”62 This controversy persisted throughout nineteenth-century U.S. debates over
exercise of the police power. Proponents of the common law approach favored it because it “gave precedence to the communal
norms and lay knowledge that juries could bring to regulatory decisions and the specialized knowledge of legally-trained judges.”63
Nineteenth-century English nuisance cases were tried before juries
who expressed the sense of the community concerning what enterprises caused too much environmental harm to be located near
populated areas.64 With the shift away from the common law toward
the administrative state as a vehicle for protecting public health and
the environment, it no longer appears obvious that the common
law is more protective of communal norms than precautionary regulation.
II. The Massachusetts v EPA Decision
Massachusetts v EPA came before the Court the Term after
it split so badly in Rapanos. The case originated in October 1999
when a group of public interest organizations ﬁled a petition asking
EPA to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases from new motor
vehicles under § 202 of the Clean Air Act. When the petition was
ﬁled, no one would have predicted that it ultimately would spawn
a monumental Supreme Court decision. Petitions for rulemaking
often languish unanswered, and it was only after a lawsuit ﬁled in
December 2002 to compel a response was settled by EPA agreeing
to respond to the petition that the agency denied it in September
2003.65 EPA argued that it did not have the authority to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act and that even if
it had such authority it would choose not to exercise it.
EPA’s denial of the petition was challenged in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit by the public interest groups joined
62
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by twelve states, the territory of American Samoa, and the cities of
Baltimore and New York City. A three-judge panel of that court
split sharply in upholding EPA’s decision by a 2–1 vote.66 Judge
Sentelle concluded that because the harm alleged from global warming was so widespread it did not constitute the kind of “particularized injuries” that could give the petitioners standing to challenge
EPA’s decision. Without speciﬁcally deciding the questions of
standing and statutory authority, Judge Randolph concluded that
EPA had acted properly in denying the petition. Judge Tatel dissented, concluding that the petitioners had standing, that EPA had
the authority to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases under the
Clean Air Act, and that EPA had not adequately justiﬁed its denial
of the petition.
While the inability of the D.C. Circuit panel to muster a majority
on any particular rationale for upholding EPA’s denial of the petition left its decision a confused muddle, few expected the Supreme
Court to agree to review it. Not only was there no circuit conﬂict,
but there was no possibility of one developing in the future because
the Clean Air Act gives the D.C. Circuit exclusive venue to review
EPA decisions of national applicability.67 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court agreed to review the D.C. Circuit’s decision.
When the Court issued its decision in April 2007, no one was
surprised that the case was decided by a 5– 4 vote of the Justices,
though the ultimate outcome was surprising to many. In the course
of deciding to reverse EPA’s decision not to regulate emissions of
greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act, the Court addressed
constitutional principles of standing to sue, interpreted the Clean
Air Act, and applied principles of administrative law to reject EPA’s
rationale for failing to act as arbitrary and capricious. The Court
held: (1) that the harm projected from global warming and climate
change gives Massachusetts standing to sue even if the harm is
widely shared and EPA can do little to alleviate most of it, (2) that
the Clean Air Act gives EPA the authority to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions, and (3) that EPA is required to regulate such emissions unless it determines that they do not contribute to climate
change or the agency provides a reasonable explanation of why it
cannot or will not determine whether they do.
66
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At a most basic level the result in Massachusetts v EPA is easy to
understand: Justice Kennedy, the only “swing” Justice now on the
Court, sided with the four liberal/moderate Justices (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) instead of the four conservatives (Scalia,
Thomas, C. J. Roberts, and Alito).68 More than one-third of all the
Court’s decisions in its 2006 Term were the product of 5– 4 votes
and Justice Kennedy was in the majority in all twenty-four of those
cases. Justice Stevens’s majority opinion in the case shows signs of
an attempt to court Justice Kennedy by extensively quoting from
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife.
In his majority opinion Justice Stevens concluded that states have
a special interest in protecting their land and citizens from environmental harm and that it is not necessary for EPA regulations to
redress most of the harm for a state to have standing. He concluded
that the Clean Air Act was meant to be a comprehensive regulatory
scheme that requires EPA to control air pollutants that pose signiﬁcant risks to the environment.
Justice Stevens’s majority opinion spawned passionate dissents
from Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia. The Chief Justice
argued that the effects of global warming are too generalized, too
uncertain, and too unlikely to be effectively redressed by domestic
regulation to provide any plaintiff with standing to sue. Justice Scalia
argued for deference to EPA’s decisions that it has no authority to
regulate greenhouse gases and that it would not exercise such authority even if it had it. He endorsed the notion that greenhouse
gases are not covered by the text of the Clean Air Act because
“pollutants” are only substances that foul the air near the surface
of the earth.
a. standing to sue
One surprise in Massachusetts v EPA is the ease with which the
majority dispatched concern about the states’ standing to sue. The
Court upheld the states’ standing by reaching back to a centuryold precedent not cited by any of the parties to the case—Georgia
v Tennessee Copper Company.69 At oral argument Justice Kennedy
had surprised counsel for Massachusetts by mentioning the case
68
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and describing it as “your best case” for establishing standing.70
Decided at a time when the Court itself served as an original forum
for resolving environmental disputes between states, the Tennessee
Copper decision upheld a state’s right to an injunction to stop harm
caused by pollution originating in another state.
Despite vigorous objections from Chief Justice Roberts joined
by the other three dissenters, the holding on standing may prove
to be the most signiﬁcant aspect of the Court’s decision. Building
on previous warnings from Justice Kennedy that standing to enforce regulatory statutes should not require proof of common law
injury, Justice Stevens’s majority opinion ﬁrmly rejects the notion
that litigants should only have access to court when the harm they
assert is neither too small nor too large, but rather “just right”—
a kind of “Goldilocks” theory of standing. It also rejects the idea
that standing is defeated if success enforcing a regulatory statute
is unlikely to resolve more than a small portion of the problem
the statute seeks to address. This represents a welcome appreciation of the realities of the modern administrative state and the
purposes of precautionary regulation.
On closer analysis, Justice Kennedy’s decision to join in full
Justice Stevens’s majority opinion on the issue of standing should
not be that surprising. Justice Kennedy previously had been careful
to indicate that his views on standing were not as extreme as Justice
Scalia’s. In Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife Justice Kennedy authored
an important concurring opinion, joined by Justice Souter, that
signiﬁcantly tempered the result because the two concurring
Justices were part of a six-Justice majority. Justices Kennedy and
Souter indicated that the purchase of a plane ticket or the announcement of a speciﬁc date on which members of the plaintiff
group would visit sites affected by the challenged regulation would
be sufﬁcient to establish standing. Justice Kennedy also expressed
greater receptivity to the plaintiff ’s “ecosystem nexus,” “animal
nexus,” and “vocational nexus” theories of standing,71 which Justice
Scalia had rejected with great disdain. He also clearly rejected the
notion that standing should be limited by common law principles.
“As Government programs and policies become more complex
70
Transcript of Oral Argument, Massachusetts v EPA, No 05-1120, *15 (argued Nov 29,
2006), online at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/
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and far-reaching, we must be sensitive to the articulation of new
rights of action that do not have clear analogs in our commonlaw tradition.”72 Justice Kennedy observed that “Congress has the
power to deﬁne injuries and articulate chains of causation that will
give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before . . . .”73
In its discussion of standing, Justice Stevens’s majority opinion in
Massachusetts v EPA quotes this language and emphasizes that Congress has authorized the very type of challenge to EPA action that
the petitioners brought in the case.
The papers of the late Justice Harry A. Blackmun shed further
light on Justice Kennedy’s differences with Justice Scalia’s efforts
to restrict environmental standing. They reveal that Justice Kennedy stated that he was “not comfortable” in 1990 when voting
with Justice Scalia at conference to restrict environmental standing
in Lujan v National Wildlife Federation.74 In Lujan v Defenders of
Wildlife, Justices Kennedy and Souter refused for months to join
Justice Scalia’s initial draft opinion because it sought to convert the
prudential notion that courts should decline to hear generalized
grievances into a constitutional one that would bar environmental
plaintiffs from seeking redress for widely shared injuries.75 In a
memo to Justice Scalia, Justice Souter wrote:
Despite ambiguous dicta in some of our cases, I doubt anyone
would lack standing to sue on the basis of a concrete injury that
everyone else has suffered; Congress might for instance, grant
everyone standing to challenge government action that would
rip open the ozone layer and expose all Americans to unhealthy
doses of radiation. Yet the repeated references to a particularity
requirement, which might be taken as conceptually independent
of a concreteness requirement, draw that conclusion into doubt.76

After Justice Kennedy expressed agreement with Justice Souter and
informed Justice Scalia that he would not join his majority opinion
unless he deleted the references to “particularity,” Justice Scalia
72
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made the requested changes.77 A law clerk later reported to Justice
Blackmun that word had spread throughout the building that Justice
Scalia was “irate at [ Justice Kennedy] for submitting his concurrence
and felt that it ‘scuttled’ his majority opinion.”78
Justice Scalia’s campaign to restrict environmental standing suffered its worst setback eight years after Lujan, when all the Justices
except for Scalia and Thomas joined Justice Ginsburg’s majority
opinion in Friends of the Earth v Laidlaw Environmental Services.79
This decision rejected the notion that citizen plaintiffs must prove
signiﬁcant harm to the environment in order to establish standing
to bring enforcement actions against polluters who violated their
Clean Water Act permits. Traditional common law notions of standing initially would have barred the beneﬁciaries of regulation from
having standing while providing regulated entities access to the
courts. The Supreme Court halted this trend in Laidlaw, declaring
that to insist that plaintiffs demonstrate “injury to the environment”
would “raise the standing hurdle higher than the necessary showing
for success on the merits in an action alleging noncompliance with
[a Clean Water Act] permit.”80 The Court instead endorsed standing
for plaintiffs with reasonable concerns about the effects of environmental violations on the environment in areas where they live
or recreate.81 The majority’s broad view of environmental standing
in Massachusetts v EPA conﬁrms the continued vitality of Laidlaw,
though by a margin (5– 4) substantially narrower than the 7–2 result
in Laidlaw.
In its discussion of standing in Massachusetts v EPA, Justice Stevens’s majority opinion emphasizes the century-old precedent not
cited in any of the briefs, but mentioned at oral argument by Justice
Kennedy: Georgia v Tennessee Copper Company.82 This case was a
landmark in the development of the federal common law of interstate nuisance and the ﬁrst case in which the U.S. Supreme Court
issued an injunction to limit interstate pollution. In 1904 the state
of Georgia invoked the Court’s original jurisdiction over disputes
between states to sue two companies that owned copper smelters
77
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in the extreme southeast corner of Tennessee. Sulfur emissions from
the smelters had destroyed vegetation over vast swaths of land extending into northern Georgia. Private nuisance suits against the
companies operating the smelters—the Tennessee Copper Company and the Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Company—had
resulted in damages awards, but the Tennessee Supreme Court had
refused to issue an injunction to limit the pollution because of the
importance of the smelters to the local economy.83 The governor
of Georgia had personally appealed to the governor of Tennessee
to take action to stop the pollution, but the Tennessee governor
responded that he had no authority to do so.
In October 1905 the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Georgia’s public nuisance claim, citing Missouri v Illinois,84 where it had
heard an original action involving interstate water pollution. In the
Missouri case the Court had declared that “if the health and comfort
of the inhabitants of a State are threatened, the State is the proper
party to represent and defend them.”85
Georgia litigated the case on the assumption that it would have
to show damage to state property in order to be entitled to relief.
Thus, it compiled evidence of erosion of public roads caused by
the destruction of all vegetation in the vicinity of the smelters. More
than two thousand afﬁdavits ultimately were submitted to the record
as well as the report of a commission appointed by the governor
of Georgia to investigate the extent of harm caused by the smelter
emissions. Georgia’s conclusions were supported by testimony from
three chemists, eight foresters, four entomologists, and a geologist.
It submitted photographs to document the effects of the pollution,
including the destruction of vegetation and attendant soil erosion.
Afﬁdavits were presented to document the destruction of crops,
gardens, orchards, forests, and farms and injuries to roads and highways. More than ﬁfteen hundred witnesses stated that the emissions
had caused them some damage, including harm to their vocations
and means of livelihood.
In the Court’s decision, issued in May 1907, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes deemed it unnecessary for Georgia to prove injury to
state property. He noted:
83
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The case has been argued largely as if it were one between two
private parties; but it is not. The very elements that would be
relied upon in a suit between fellow-citizens as a ground for
equitable relief are wanting here. The State owns very little of
the territory alleged to be affected, and the damage to it capable
of estimate in money, possibly, at least, is small. . . . The alleged
damage to the state as a private owner is merely a makeweight,
and we may lay on one side the dispute as to whether the destruction of forests has led to the gullying of its roads.86

Because Georgia was suing “for an injury to it in its capacity of
quasi-sovereign,” Holmes declared that it “has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air
within its domain.”87 Thus, he concluded that the state’s quasisovereign interest should give it “the last word as to whether its
mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall
breathe pure air.”88 Because the Court found that the evidence
clearly established that sulfur emissions from the smelters caused
signiﬁcant damage in Georgia, it declared that the state was entitled
to an injunction to limit the emissions. Relying on this precedent
a century later, the Massachusetts v EPA Court concluded that the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts “is entitled to special solicitude
in our standing analysis.”89
In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts argues that the majority has
created a new relaxed standard of standing for cases brought by
states. He maintains that the discussion of quasi-sovereign state
interests in Tennessee Copper was not relevant to the question of
standing, but rather to a state’s greater entitlement to equitable
relief when it sues in the capacity of parens patriae. To be sure,
Tennessee Copper predated by several decades the appearance of
standing as a distinct analytical concept in the Court’s jurisprudence.90 But the logic behind the Court’s willingness to entertain
an action by a state to protect its citizens from environmental harm
caused by sources outside its jurisdiction—that the state’s entry into
the union ceded to the federal government (as represented by the
Supreme Court) the state’s ability to defend its sovereign interests
86
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against pollution originating outside its boundaries—is entirely unaffected by the development of standing doctrines.
Moreover, Justice Stevens’s majority opinion then goes on to
explain in completely conventional terms why Massachusetts meets
every element of traditional standing doctrine: injury, causation, and
redressability. He states that the standing afﬁdavits submitted by
the Commonwealth “have satisﬁed the most demanding standards
of the adversarial process.”91 Thus, while the majority’s discussion
of standing plausibly can be interpreted as relying on a special rule
of standing for states, it is better understood as holding that the
state would have standing without the need for any special rule,
contrary to the assertions of the Chief Justice. Contrary to the Chief
Justice’s surmise, the failure of any litigant to cite Tennessee Copper
is probably more of a commentary on the litigants’ neglect of legal
history than on the decision’s precedential value.
This is not meant to suggest that it necessarily would be a bad
idea to establish special standing rules for cases involving challenges
to decisions by administrative agencies. The traditional private law
model of litigation involving plaintiffs alleging harm caused by the
actions of a speciﬁc defendant seems ill-suited to litigation challenging decisions by administrative agencies. Agencies were created
to establish precautionary regulations preventing harm before it
occurs. Actions to require agency ﬁdelity to laws authorizing precautionary regulation should not require plaintiffs to demonstrate
the kind of injury that would give rise to redress under the common
law. The Court already has recognized this, at least implicitly, by
establishing special standing rules for cases involving allegation of
procedural injury. A wholesale rethinking of standing doctrine applicable to challenges to agency action would be a most welcome
development.
Perhaps the most signiﬁcant portion of the majority opinion is
its discussion of the conventional elements of standing. Gone is the
“code-pleading formalism” of Justice Scalia’s Lujan opinion92 that
sought to use standing doctrine expressly to disadvantage environmental interests. The Court’s approach instead is reminiscent of
Sierra Club v Morton where it described the purpose of standing as
“a rough attempt to put the decision as to whether review will be
91
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sought in the hands of those who have a direct stake in the outcome”
that will neither “insulate executive action from judicial review” nor
“prevent any public interests from being protected through the
judicial process.”93 Addressing the injury prong of standing doctrine,
the majority forcefully rejects the notion advocated by Justice Scalia
in Lujan that injuries that are widely shared cannot give rise to
standing.94 The Court concludes that the harms caused by climate
change—sea level rise destroying coastal property, irreversible harm
to natural ecosystems, reduction of water storage in snowpack, and
an increase in the ferocity of storms and the spread of disease—
can give rise to standing even though they will affect vast areas and
large populations.95 Thus, the Court expressly rejects the “Goldilocks” approach to standing—the notion that the injury alleged by
plaintiffs has to be neither too small nor too large, but “just right.”
Equally important is the Court’s treatment of the causation and
redressability prongs of standing doctrine. The Court rejects the
notion that because auto emissions are only a small portion of total
global greenhouse gas emissions they cannot give rise to standing.
Justice Stevens notes that regulatory agencies “do not generally
resolve massive problems in one fell regulatory swoop.”96 He deems
“erroneous” the “assumption that a small incremental step, because
it is incremental, can never be attacked in a federal judicial forum.”97
This is enormously important because a contrary rule “would doom
most challenges to regulatory action.”98 Likewise the plaintiffs need
not demonstrate that success in court in itself will solve the climate
change problem, only that it will help slow or reduce it. Even if
developing countries increase their emissions of greenhouse gases,
a reduction in domestic emissions will help slow the pace of climate
change, which is sufﬁcient for meeting the redressability requirement.99
The Court summarizes why it ﬁnds plaintiffs to have standing
in the following manner:
93
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[T]he rise in sea levels associated with global warming has already
harmed and will continue to harm Massachusetts. The risk of
catastrophic harm, though remote, is nevertheless real. That risk
would be reduced to some extent if petitioners received the relief
they seek. We therefore hold that petitioners have standing to
challenge the EPA’s denial of their rulemaking petition.100

In a strident dissent, Chief Justice Roberts maintains that even
if global warming is a “crisis” and “the most pressing environmental
problem of our time,” the Court should not hear this case because
it is a problem best addressed by Congress and the President.101
Dismissing the forty-three unchallenged declarations submitted by
petitioners about the adverse impact of climate change as “pure
conjecture,” he argues that global warming is too widespread, occurring over too long a time span, and affected by too many other
complexities for the contribution from emissions of U.S. motor
vehicles to give rise to standing. Even though this source represents
6 percent of global carbon dioxide emissions and 4 percent of global
greenhouse gas emissions, the Chief Justice deems it to be playing
only a “bit part” in the climate change problem. He does not state
precisely how large, how concentrated, how fast, or how free of
other complexities a source category’s contribution to the problem
would have to be to give rise to standing.
The Chief Justice’s dissent illustrates the inappropriateness of
applying private law models of adversary litigation when determining who should be able to seek judicial review of decisions by administrative agencies. Unlike the traditional model of private law
litigation where one party seeks redress for harm caused by another,
public law litigation seeks to require agencies to conform to law
when exercising their regulatory authorities to prevent diffuse harm
to the general public. If plaintiffs must demonstrate the same level
of individualized proof of causal injury that could give rise to liability
at common law before they can access courts to compel agencies
to obey the law, the law’s precautionary purposes will be severely
undermined. Moreover, courts reviewing public law challenges to
agency action are not well equipped to make the kind of factual
determinations of causal injury that the private law model requires.
Chief Justice Roberts suggests in his dissent that no matter how
100
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serious an environmental problem may be, no one should be able
to enforce an agency’s legal obligation to respond to it unless they
can demonstrate something akin to the kind of causal injury that
would be redressable in a common law action. This ignores the fact
that the very laws Congress authorized citizens to enforce were
adopted in reaction to the inadequacies of the common law for
preventing chronic and diffuse environmental harm. Reimporting
stringent common law causation requirements into standing analysis
would make it impossible for anyone to enforce these laws, frustrating achievement of the congressional purpose.
The Chief Justice’s dissent echoes the arguments made by dissenters in a crucial, early D.C. Circuit decision upholding EPA’s
ﬁrst regulations limiting the amount of lead additives in gasoline.102
Standing was not at issue in that case because it involved a challenge
made by the lead industry, which maintained that the regulations
should be invalidated because EPA could not prove speciﬁc harm
to public health caused by lead emissions from gasoline. EPA argued
that the harmful effects of lead were well known, that gasoline lead
additives signiﬁcantly contributed to levels of lead in the ambient
air, and that this added signiﬁcantly to the total body burden of
lead, harming public health. However, a panel of the court initially
invalidated the regulations, ﬁnding by a 2–1 vote that the case
against gasoline additives was “speculative and inconclusive [ ] at
best” because the agency could not prove that speciﬁc instances of
harm to public health had been caused by gasoline lead additives.103
The D.C. Circuit then reviewed the case en banc, parsing a record
that ran for more than ten thousand pages. It ultimately reversed
the panel by a 5–4 vote, upholding the EPA regulations. In his
dissent, Judge Wilkey argued that EPA had not adequately demonstrated a causal connection between lead emissions and harm to
public health. “[O]nly if the Administrator can say that an identiﬁable measurable increment of lead in the human body is derived
from auto fuel additives and that this measurable increment of lead
itself (taking into consideration all other sources of lead) causes a
signiﬁcant health hazard, can the Administrator claim that controlling or prohibiting lead would reduce signiﬁcantly such health
102
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hazard.”104 Writing for the majority, Judge J. Skelly Wright rejected
this approach:
Where a statute is precautionary in nature, the evidence difﬁcult
to come by, uncertain, or conﬂicting because it is on the frontiers
of scientiﬁc knowledge, the regulations designed to protect the
public health, and the decision that of an expert administrator,
we will not demand rigorous step-by-step proof of cause and
effect. Such proof may be impossible to obtain if the precautionary purpose of the statute is to be served.105

The court held that EPA’s reasoning was sound and adequately
supported by the evidence, rejecting the notion that the agency
should be required to produce a deﬁnitive study quantifying the
harm from gasoline lead additives.
Writing for the dissenters, Judge Wilkey noted that many other
sources of lead exposure existed (e.g., diet, drinking water, peeling
lead-based paint) and that EPA could not quantify the precise increment contributed by emissions from gasoline lead additives. He
argued that only convincing proof of actual harm would sufﬁce and
he decried the “amazing lengths” the majority will go “to produce
a decision for some uncertain, ill-deﬁned, supposed environmental
beneﬁt.”106 Judge Wright responded that it made no sense to employ
“tunnel-like reasoning”107 that would foreclose regulation of gasoline lead additives simply because other sources of lead exposure
contributed to the lead poisoning problem, particularly when “lead
automobile emissions were, far and away, the most readily reduced
signiﬁcant source of environmental lead.”108
Chief Justice Roberts’s arguments that there is insufﬁcient proof
of harm from climate change to establish standing mirror the arguments of the Ethyl dissenters. In addition to deeming the harm
to be too uncertain and insufﬁciently documented, the Chief Justice
argues that because other sources contribute to the harm, standing
104
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is foreclosed. He opines that Massachusetts fails to meet the redressability prong of standing doctrine because future increases in
greenhouse gas emissions from China and India may wipe out any
beneﬁt from controlling U.S. vehicle emissions. Yet, as Justice Stevens notes, any reductions in greenhouse gas emissions achieved by
EPA regulation will contribute to some reduction in the harmful
effects of climate change, an argument the Chief Justice characterizes as: “Every little bit helps, so Massachusetts can sue over any
little bit.”109 Justice Stevens responds that accepting the premise
“that a small incremental step, because it is incremental, can never
be attacked in a federal judicial forum . . . would doom most challenges to regulatory action.”110 The history of EPA’s regulation of
gasoline lead additives amply demonstrates this. The regulation
upheld in Ethyl was a crucial initial step in the total phaseout of
gasoline lead additives, a measure now generally considered to be
among the most beneﬁcial EPA ever has adopted and one now
widely emulated throughout the world.
To be sure, Ethyl was not a case about standing, but as the Court
indicated in Laidlaw the factual showing necessary to establish standing should not be more onerous than that needed to establish success on the merits.111 Yet Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent in Massachusetts v EPA seems to advocate a return to such an approach.
Because the Chief Justice’s opinion is joined by the three other
dissenters, it conﬁrms that the Court is now even more sharply
divided in its approach to standing than it was in Laidlaw, where
only Justices Scalia and Thomas embraced extraordinarily restrictive
requirements for environmental plaintiffs.
The Chief Justice concludes by arguing that the majority has
“made standing seem a lawyer’s game” by adopting “utterly manipulable” standards reminiscent of the Court’s approach in
SCRAP.112 One can fairly question whose approach to standing—
the majority’s or the dissent’s—is more prone to manipulation and
more likely to be used systematically to bar certain types of plaintiffs
from access to the courts. The majority’s approach to standing
clearly is more compatible with lawsuits by the beneﬁciaries of
environmental regulation who are more numerous and more widely
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dispersed than business interests regulated under the environmental
statutes.
b. scope of regulatory authority under the clean air act
As illustrated by its decision in the Rapanos case, the Roberts
Court has been sharply divided on issues involving the scope of
federal regulatory authority under the environmental laws. Some
observers of the Court believed that this split would not reemerge
in Massachusetts v EPA because—assuming the Court reached the
issue, instead of deciding the case on grounds of standing or of
the EPA’s discretion not to decide—the language of the Clean Air
Act was so sweeping that the question of the EPA’s authority to
regulate emissions of greenhouse gases that contribute to climate
change was not a close one. However, the Court ultimately split
5– 4 on the question of EPA’s authority.
Section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act empowers EPA to prescribe by regulation “standards applicable to the emission of any
air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or
new motor vehicle engines, which in [the EPA Administrator’s]
judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”113
In 1998 EPA’s general counsel issued a legal opinion ﬁnding that
carbon dioxide, a greenhouse gas, could be regulated under the
Clean Air Act, a position endorsed by his successor in 1999. When
EPA denied the petition to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from
motor vehicles, its new general counsel revoked the prior legal
opinion and replaced it with his own. The new opinion concluded
that carbon dioxide is not an “air pollutant” regulable under the
Act and thus EPA did not have the authority to grant the relief
requested in the petition.
To justify this conclusion, EPA relied heavily on the Court’s
decision in FDA v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.114 In that case
a 5– 4 majority reversed efforts by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to regulate tobacco products under the federal
Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act (FDCA). While the FDA had long
believed that it did not have the authority to regulate tobacco
products under the FDCA, it changed its mind after concluding
113
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that tobacco products were used primarily to deliver nicotine to
smokers, bringing them within the deﬁnition of “drug delivery
devices” subject to regulation under the FDCA.
Rather than deferring to the agency’s interpretation of its regulatory authorities pursuant to Chevron, the majority in Brown &
Williamson concluded that Congress clearly did not intend to give
FDA the authority to regulate tobacco products because the
agency might be required to ban them entirely to achieve the goals
of the Act. Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor described
the thousands of premature deaths from smoking-related diseases
to be “one of the most troubling public health problems facing
our Nation today.”115 But she concluded that no matter how serious the problem the agency seeks to address, it could not go
beyond the bounds of the authority given it by Congress.116
In similar fashion, EPA argued in Massachusetts v EPA that because Congress was aware of the importance of the problem of
climate change, but had not expressly given the agency a directive
to regulate emissions that cause it, the agency lacked the authority
to do so under the Clean Air Act. Thus, it concluded that greenhouse gases could not be considered to be “air pollutants” subject
to regulation under the Act.
Despite the agency’s Brown & Williamson argument, EPA’s refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions bore all the earmarks
of a politically dictated decision for which the agency had to manufacture a supporting legal rationale. The clear text of the Act
seems to contradict the agency’s position. The Clean Air Act
broadly deﬁnes “air pollution” to include “any air pollution agent
or combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical,
biological, radioactive . . . substance or matter which is emitted
into or otherwise enters the ambient air.”117 On its face, it is difﬁcult to see how greenhouse gases could fail to be covered by
such a broad deﬁnition. EPA has a legal obligation under the Clean
Air Act to regulate air pollutants from motor vehicles that “cause,
or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated
to endanger public health or welfare . . .”118 and “welfare” is
115
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broadly deﬁned to include “effects on . . . weather . . . and climate.”119
In his majority opinion, Justice Stevens concluded that the statutory text of the Clean Air Act unambiguously includes carbon
dioxide and other greenhouse gases within the deﬁnition of “air
pollutant”: “On its face, the deﬁnition embraces all airborne compounds of whatever stripe, and underscores that intent through
the repeated use of the word ‘any.’”120 He rejected any notion that
Congress had implicitly directed EPA not to regulate greenhouse
gases as not remotely plausible and found no conﬂict between
congressional funding for climate change research and any preexisting mandate to regulate harmful air pollutants.
Perhaps the most signiﬁcant portion of the Court’s discussion
of statutory interpretation is its treatment of Brown & Williamson.
Justice Stevens distinguished the decision on several grounds. First
he notes that, unlike tobacco products regulated as “drugs,” EPA
would not be required to ban all emissions of greenhouse gases,
but rather only to regulate them. (To be sure, FDA had disclaimed
any intent to ban tobacco in Brown & Williamson, but the Court
majority nonetheless expressed the view that the Food, Drug &
Cosmetic Act would require such radical action.) Second, unlike
the FDA, EPA had not long disclaimed authority to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions and Congress had not enacted legislation
conﬁrming the lack of such authority. Finally, the Court rejected
the notion that regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from motor
vehicles necessarily would conﬂict with the Department of Transportation’s (DOT’s) duty to set fuel efﬁciency standards, an argument made by auto manufacturers seeking to preempt state
controls on emissions from their products. The Court concluded
that the fact “that DOT sets mileage standards in no way licenses
EPA to shirk its environmental responsibilities. . . . The two obligations may overlap, but there is no reason to think the two
agencies cannot both administer their obligations and yet avoid
inconsistency.”121
The Court majority concluded by noting that Congress designed the Clean Air Act to provide comprehensive protection
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against air pollution and to be capable of responding to changed
circumstances and new scientiﬁc understandings. “While the Congresses that drafted § 202(a)(1) might not have appreciated the
possibility that burning fossil fuels could lead to global warming,
they did understand that without regulatory ﬂexibility, changing
circumstances and scientiﬁc developments would soon render the
Clean Air Act obsolete.”122 This is reﬂected in the broad language
used by Congress in “an intentional effort to confer the ﬂexibility
necessary to forestall” the Act from becoming obsolete. The Court
concluded that “[b]ecause greenhouse gases ﬁt well within the
Clean Air Act’s capacious deﬁnition of ‘air pollutant’ . . . EPA
has the statutory authority to regulate the emission of such gases
from new motor vehicles.”123
In dissent Justice Scalia argues that greenhouse gases are not
“agent[s] of air pollution”124 because substances that pollute the
air do so primarily only at ground level or near the surface of the
earth. According to Scalia, EPA’s conception of what constitutes
air pollution properly focuses on impurities in the ambient air at
ground level or near the surface of the earth and not on substances
in the upper atmosphere like greenhouse gases. He derives this
conclusion—which seems dubious, in view of the expansive language of the statute—by focusing on dictionary deﬁnitions of the
words “pollute” (“[t]o make or render impure or unclean”) and
“air” that focus more on air at ground level.125
Four of the Justices in the majority in Massachusetts v EPA—
Justices Breyer, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg—were the four dissenters in Brown & Williamson. Justice Kennedy is the lone defector
from the majority in Brown & Williamson. The two newest members of the Court—Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito—join
Justices Scalia and Thomas, who were in the majority in Brown
& Williamson, in adopting its approach to statutory interpretation.
This may not herald a long-term shift away from Brown & Williamson because it is unclear how durable Justice Kennedy’s defection will be. Two months after Massachusetts v EPA was decided,
Justice Kennedy rejoined the four dissenters from that case to
form a ﬁve-Justice majority in National Association of Homebuilders
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v Defenders of Wildlife.126 In that case the Court refused to read
important requirements of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) as
compatible with the Clean Water Act (CWA). The Court held
that the crucial consultation and no-jeopardy provisions of Section
7 of the ESA are not applicable when EPA delegates administration
of the CWA’s national permit program to states because those
provisions apply only when a federal agency is engaged in discretionary action. This stands in sharp contrast with the Massachusetts
v EPA majority’s conclusion that the Clean Air Act should be read
ﬂexibly to avoid conﬂict with the Energy Policy and Conservation
Act.
c. exercise of agency discretion
To justify its denial of the petition to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions from motor vehicles, EPA concluded that even if it had
the authority to regulate such emissions, it would decline to do
so. But the majority in Massachusetts v EPA rejected this conclusion
on the ground that it was founded on “reasoning divorced from
the statutory text.”127 The Court conceded that EPA “has significant latitude as to the manner, timing, content, and coordination
of its regulations with those of other agencies.”128 But it stated
that this was “not a roving license to ignore the statutory text,”
but rather “a direction to exercise discretion within deﬁned statutory limits.”129 Thus, it held that:
Under the clear terms of the Clean Air Act, EPA can avoid
taking further action only if it determines that greenhouse gases
do not contribute to climate change or if it provides some reasonable explanation as to why it cannot or will not exercise its
discretion to determine whether they do.130

Because climate change is a global problem that will be solved
only if addressed globally, EPA had sought to defend its refusal
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions on the ground that it might
interfere with the President’s ability to negotiate a global solution.
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The Court brushed aside these concerns. While noting that it had
“neither the expertise nor the authority to evaluate these policy
judgments,” it concluded that they did not “amount to a reasoned
justiﬁcation for declining to form a scientiﬁc judgment” about the
impact of greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles on climate change.131
The Court expressly rejected the notion that the President’s
foreign policy powers could trump domestic environmental mandates. It recognized that “the President has broad authority in
foreign affairs,” but it declared that such “authority does not extend to the refusal to execute domestic laws.”132 An amicus brief
ﬁled on behalf of former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
argued that there is no tension between domestic regulation of
greenhouse gas emissions and the ability of the United States to
conduct foreign policy on climate change, particularly since the
U.S. policy has been to encourage other nations to take voluntary
action to reduce such emissions.133 The brief also warned of the
danger of allowing foreign policy concerns to trump domestic legal
requirements.
Finally, the Court rejected the notion that uncertainty surrounding various aspects of climate change justiﬁed EPA’s refusal
to act. “If the scientiﬁc uncertainty is so profound that it precludes
EPA from making a reasoned judgment as to whether greenhouse
gases contribute to global warming, EPA must say so.”134 The
Court declared that the agency’s expressed policy preference not
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions “because of some residual
uncertainty” is “irrelevant” to the statutory question of “whether
sufﬁcient information exists to make an endangerment ﬁnding.”135
The Court thus found that EPA had acted arbitrarily and capriciously because it had not offered a “reasoned explanation for its
refusal to decide whether greenhouse gases cause or contribute to
climate change.”136
In his dissent, Justice Scalia argued that EPA had no obligation
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to decide whether greenhouse gas emissions contribute to climate
change because it had sufﬁcient reasons to defer making such a
judgment. Justice Scalia stated that he is “willing to assume” arguendo “that the Administrator’s discretion in this regard is not
entirely unbounded—that if he has no reasonable basis for deferring judgment he must grasp the nettle at once.”137 But he concluded that the reasons offered by EPA were “perfectly valid reasons” for deferring judgment. Justice Scalia argued that the Clean
Air Act “says nothing at all about the reasons for which the Administrator may defer making a judgment . . . .”138 Thus, he concluded that there is no warrant for the majority’s claim that the
reasons proffered by the Administrator are divorced from the statutory text. In fact he maintained that EPA has indeed “said precisely” that scientiﬁc uncertainty is so profound that it precludes
the agency from making a reasoned judgment whether greenhouse
gases contribute to global warming.139 Justice Scalia and the other
three dissenters thus are willing to wrap EPA in the mantle of
global warming skeptics to defend the agency’s refusal to act. The
fact that a view so divorced from the scientiﬁc mainstream would
command deference from four Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court
is disheartening.
There is nothing truly exceptional about the Court’s decision
from the standpoint of administrative law. The Court did conﬁrm
that agency denials of rulemaking petitions are subject to judicial
review, distinguishing them from refusals to initiate enforcement
actions,140 but this was consistent with the prior conclusions of
the courts of appeals. While it may be true that the U.S. Supreme
Court itself had never before reversed an agency’s denial of a
rulemaking petition, this may be a product of the fact that most
such petitions languish unanswered by agencies. The Administrative Procedure Act provides for judicial review of “agency action,”
which is deﬁned to include “the whole or a part of an agency rule
. . . or denial thereof, or failure to act.”141 As the Court notes,142
the Clean Air Act’s judicial review provisions provide for review
137
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of decisions promulgating standards under § 202 of the Act and
of “ﬁnal action” taken under the Act, which would seem to include
denial of the petition at issue in the case. There was no controversy
over the reviewability of EPA’s action and the Court’s decision
simply conﬁrms what already was widely understood. In this sense
it is akin to the Court’s State Farm decision where the Court itself
conﬁrmed for the ﬁrst time that arbitrary and capricious review
was not toothless even as applied to an agency’s decision to rescind
previously issued regulations.143 Thus, the Massachusetts v EPA decision breaks no new ground from the standpoint of judicial review
of an agency’s refusal to act.
However, the majority’s willingness to push EPA toward grasping the regulatory “nettle” does stand in sharp contrast to the
approach the judiciary embraced during the 1980s when environmentalists sought to force the agency to take action to control the
nation’s acid rain problem. Even though the Clean Air Act had
provisions giving EPA authority to force upwind sources of pollution to reduce emissions to prevent harm to downwind states,
EPA refused to exercise such authority. Despite mounting evidence
of the damage caused by acid rain, in case after case brought by
environmental interests, the courts refused to force EPA to act.
In one case, then Circuit Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg was remarkably candid in explaining why the judiciary was unwilling to
require EPA to act:
As counsel for the EPA acknowledged at oral argument, the
EPA has taken no action against sources of interstate air pollution under either § 126(b) or § 110(a)(2)(E) in the decadeplus since those provisions were enacted. Congress, when it is
so minded, is fully capable of instructing the EPA to address
particular matters promptly. . . . Congress did not supply such
direction in this instance; instead, it allowed and has left unchecked the EPA’s current approach to interstate air pollution.
The judiciary, therefore, is not the proper place in which to
urge alteration of the Agency’s course.144

In Massachusetts v EPA it is the Supreme Court, and not the
D.C. Circuit, that is requiring the agency to reconsider its refusal
to decide whether to regulate. Perhaps because climate change is
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now considered a global environmental crisis far more serious than
the problem of acid rain, the Court is unwilling to tolerate continued executive inaction. It also rejects what in this age of globalization could become a nearly universally applicable excuse for
agency inaction—that domestic regulation might interfere with
the President’s ability to negotiate a global approach to a problem.
Professor Ronald Cass opines that “the Justices stretch, twist,
and torture administrative law doctrines to avoid the inconvenient
truth that this is not a matter in which judges have any real role
to play.”145 But in fact the Court is resuming precisely the role it
played in the early twentieth century in responding to states’ concerns about environmental problems originating outside their borders. When activities causing signiﬁcant, foreseeable environmental harm had not been controlled by other government entities,
the judiciary for centuries was the vehicle for providing redress.
Now this role has been largely delegated to administrative agencies
by the enactment of comprehensive regulatory programs to protect
the environment. In Massachusetts v EPA the Court acts to require
EPA to reconsider using these authorities to address a critical
global problem, a far more modest step than those the Court took
in the days when it wrote its own pollution control injunctions.
III. The Implications of Massachusetts v EPA
The states’ effort to force EPA to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions from motor vehicles is only one of many legal initiatives
that respond to the climate change problem.146 Yet the Court’s
decision in Massachusetts v EPA is likely to have effects that extend
far beyond the issues addressed in the case. First, the Court’s
decision appears to conﬁrm that standing doctrine is still comfortably in the mold of the Laidlaw and Sierra Club v Morton model
that does not employ it as a vehicle to disadvantage environmental
interests. While Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent attempts to conﬁne
the Court’s holding on standing to a special rule only applicable
145
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to states, the Court’s discussion of each element of traditional
standing doctrine suggests that the decision is not so conﬁned.
Yet because both the Chief Justice and Justice Alito embraced the
restrictive vision of standing Justice Scalia has long championed,
Massachusetts v EPA clariﬁes that the Court is now more closely
divided on this issue than it was in 2000 when Laidlaw was decided.
It is highly important that the Court majority expressly rejected
the notion that standing cannot be premised on harm that is widely
shared, burying the “Goldilocks” approach to standing. The Court
also clearly rejected the claim that standing is unavailable on redressability grounds unless the relief sought by litigants is likely
to solve most of a problem. Following the Court’s decision, a
federal district court rejected a challenge to state regulations to
control greenhouse gas emissions and noted:
The fact that global warming will not be solved by changes in
any one industry or by regulation of any one source of emissions
in no way undercuts the vital nature of the problem or the
validity of partial responses; rather, it points to the necessity of
responses, however incomplete when viewed individually, on
any number of fronts. (“Agencies, like legislatures, do not generally resolve massive problems in one fell regulatory swoop.
They instead whittle away at them over time.”).147

Second, the Court’s decision that the Clean Air Act gives EPA
the authority to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases raises the
question whether the Act now preempts common law nuisance
litigation premised on climate change. As noted above, more than
a quarter century ago the Supreme Court held that the federal
Clean Water Act preempted the federal common law of nuisance
for interstate water pollution.148 In Connecticut v American Electric
Power Company149 eight states and the City of New York are pursuing a federal and state common law nuisance action against six
of the largest electric utilities in the United States, which together
account for 10 percent of U.S. emissions of carbon dioxide. The
plaintiffs in this case are asking the court to order the defendants
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to make modest annual reductions in their emissions of greenhouse
gases. So long as EPA took the position that it had no authority
under the Clean Air Act to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases,
no one could credibly argue that the Act preempted the federal
common law of nuisance. Now that the U.S. Supreme Court has
ruled to the contrary, it is possible the Clean Air Act will be found
to have such preemptive effect.
Two years ago a federal district judge in New York dismissed
Connecticut v American Electric Power on political question grounds
and the case is now before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit on appeal. Shortly after Massachusetts v EPA was
decided, the Second Circuit asked the parties in this appeal to
express their views on the impact of the decision on the appeal.
Plaintiffs responded by arguing that although the Court clariﬁed
that the Clean Air Act gives EPA authority to regulate emissions
of greenhouse gases, the Act cannot preempt a federal common
law nuisance action until EPA actually issues such regulations.
Defendants maintained that the mere fact that the Act provides
EPA with authority to address climate change gives it preemptive
effect even if EPA has chosen not to exercise such authority.
Plaintiffs would seem to have the better of the argument. The
Court’s decision in City of Milwaukee v Illinois, which held the
Clean Water Act preempts the federal common law of nuisance,
was premised on the comprehensive nature of the regulatory
scheme enacted by Congress. The Clean Water Act itself prohibits
all discharges of pollutants to surface waters unless they are authorized by a permit issued pursuant to the Act. Following the
enactment of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, the Clean Air
Act now provides for a national permit program, but it does not
include any direct regulation of emissions of greenhouse gases.
Thus, until EPA acts either to establish such regulations or expressly to preempt other control of them, the federal common law
in this area would not appear to be preempted.150 However, the
political question ground for upholding dismissal of the action is
still available. In September 2007 a federal district court in San
Francisco dismissed a climate change nuisance suit brought by the
150
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California Attorney General against six large automobile manufacturers on political question grounds.151 The decision generally
followed the reasoning of Connecticut v American Electric Power. In
August 2007 a Mississippi federal district court also cited the political question doctrine as an alternative ground for rejecting a
private tort suit against oil, chemical, and coal companies alleging
that global warming exacerbated the damage caused by Hurricane
Katrina.152
One preemption issue that may be resolved by the Massachusetts
v EPA decision is the question whether state regulation of greenhouse gas emissions is preempted by the federal Energy Policy
and Conservation Act (EPCA). This argument has been the central
element of the auto industry’s challenge to California legislation
requiring the ﬁrst reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from
motor vehicles.153 In 2002 the California Legislature adopted legislation requiring the California Air Resources Board (CARB) to
issue “regulations that achieve the maximum feasible and costeffective reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles.”154 In 2004 CARB issued regulations limiting emissions of
greenhouse gases from motor vehicles beginning with the 2009
model year. The regulations set limits on emissions per mile traveled and require substantial reductions in such emissions by the
2016 vehicle year. The companies argue that because the only
practicable way to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases from motor vehicles is to improve their fuel economy, California’s regulations should be preempted by EPCA’s mandate that the Department of Transportation establish national fuel economy
standards. This argument seems a bit of a stretch since the two
programs were adopted for entirely different purposes—California’s to combat climate change and EPCA’s to reduce U.S. dependence on imported oil. In 1983 the U.S. Supreme Court held
that California’s moratorium on the construction of new nuclear
power plants was not preempted by the federal Atomic Energy
Act because it was an economic measure rather than a safety reg151

California v General Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871 (ND Cal 2007).
Comer v Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. 05-CV-436LG (SD Miss, Aug 30, 2007) (the
court also dismissed the case for lack of standing).
152

153

Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep v Witherspoon, 2006 WL 2734359 (ED Cal 2006).

154

Cal Health & Safety Code § 43018.5 (West 2006).

152

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[2007

ulation.155 Though it is true that improving fuel economy is currently the most viable option for reducing greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles—in fact carbon dioxide emissions from
vehicles usually are calculated by reference to vehicles’ fuel economy—the different purposes of the California and federal programs should be sufﬁcient to insulate the California regulations
from preemption.
In Massachusetts v EPA the Court rejected EPA’s argument that
EPCA’s mandate that DOT establish national fuel economy standards indicates that Congress could not have intended to give EPA
the authority under the Clean Air Act to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions. “The two obligations may overlap, but there is no reason to think the two agencies cannot both administer their obligations and yet avoid inconsistency.”156 While not legally controlling on the state preemption question, the Court’s decision
already has lent strong support to the argument that Congress did
not intend to preempt states from regulating greenhouse gas emissions when it adopted the EPCA. Indeed, two federal district
courts already have relied on it in rejecting challenges to state
adoption of California’s regulations on greenhouse gas emissions
from motor vehicles.157
The Court’s decision that EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously
in denying the petition to regulate greenhouse gas emissions conﬁrms the availability of judicial review for agency action refusing
to initiate rulemaking. Given that the Clean Air Act speciﬁcally
provides for such review, there is nothing exceptional about this
aspect of the decision. By highlighting the legal risk an agency
incurs when it formally denies a petition for rulemaking, the decision may give agencies even more incentive to let such petitions
languish unanswered, particularly since courts generally tolerate
lengthy delays when litigation is brought to compel a response.
While decisions not to initiate rulemaking generally are treated
with great deference by reviewing courts, as the majority recognized, if the Court had accepted EPA’s rationale for refusing to
act it would be exceedingly easy for any agency in the future to
155
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justify such a refusal. By requiring EPA to base its decision only
on statutorily relevant factors, the Court denies the agency the
option of manufacturing virtually universally applicable excuses
for inaction. Faced with an undoubtedly serious problem and a
comprehensive statutory scheme capable of responding to it, the
Court refused to allow the agency an easy escape valve to excuse
its inaction.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v EPA profoundly surprised both EPA and the White House. After believing
that the agency had successfully extricated itself from the need to
develop regulations to control greenhouse gas emissions, EPA staff
now are scrambling to develop expertise on the issue. But it is far
from clear that the decision will spur any fundamental change in
the Bush administration’s approach to climate change. Six weeks
after the Supreme Court’s decision was released, President Bush
issued Executive Order 13,432 directing EPA to cooperate with
DOT and the Department of Energy before taking any action to
address the problem of greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles.158
The climate change problem is a classic “tragedy of the commons”159 that can only be addressed effectively through global
collective action. The challenge facing the nations of the world
has been how to fashion an effective global response to this problem. Following the model of the successful Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 154 nations at the Rio
“Earth Summit” in 1992 signed the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The UNFCCC endorsed the principle of controlling emissions of greenhouse gases
to prevent harm to the global environment, but it did not establish
speciﬁc numeric limits or timetables for reducing emissions. This
treaty was signed by President George H. W. Bush and ratiﬁed
unanimously by the U.S. Senate on October 15, 1992. At the time
it ratiﬁed the treaty, the United States was the fourth nation in
the world to ratify the treaty, following action by three island
nations.160 Today 192 nations—virtually every nation in the
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world—have ratiﬁed this treaty, which entered into force on March
21, 1994.161
While the UNFCCC did not establish binding limits on emissions of greenhouse gases, it spawned a process of negotiations
that culminated in the Kyoto Protocol in December 1997. The
Protocol requires developed nations to reduce their emissions of
greenhouse gases between 2008 and 2012 to achieve an overall 5
percent reduction below 1990 levels. The United States played a
major role in negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol, which was signed
by President Clinton, but never submitted to the U.S. Senate for
ratiﬁcation. Four months before the Protocol was adopted, the
U.S. Senate had passed a resolution insisting that any global
scheme for controlling emissions of greenhouse gases should require developing countries to limit their emissions during the same
time frame as developed countries.162 But this was rejected during
the Kyoto negotiations as fundamentally unfair to the developing
world because developed countries had contributed the vast majority of emissions that created the climate change problem. The
ultimate understanding reached in Kyoto was that as a simple
matter of fairness developed countries should take the ﬁrst steps
to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases and that the question of
controls on emissions from developing countries would be addressed in subsequent negotiations.
During the 2000 presidential campaign George W. Bush had
promised to support mandatory controls on emissions of carbon
dioxide as a means for controlling climate change. But shortly
after he assumed ofﬁce, President Bush repudiated this campaign
promise and expressly rejected the Kyoto Protocol. He did so in
March 2001 immediately after his new EPA administrator, Christie
Todd Whitman, had returned from her ﬁrst international conference where she had assured her counterparts from other countries
of the new administration’s commitment to mandatory controls
on carbon dioxide emissions. Five years later President Bush reportedly conﬁded to a group of historians that he regrets the “in
your face” manner in which he repudiated the Kyoto Protocol as
“too abrupt, too deﬁant and too negative without offering an al161
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ternative.”163 But his administration has consistently taken the position that the Kyoto Protocol is fatally ﬂawed because it does not
require developing countries to control their emissions.
While the Bush administration initially believed that it could
block the Kyoto Protocol from entering into force, virtually every
country other than the United States and Australia ratiﬁed it. As
a result, the Protocol entered into force on February 16, 2005. At
the time of its entry into force, many U.S. business leaders were
quoted as saying that it was inevitable that the United States ultimately would have to adopt mandatory controls on greenhouse
gas emissions. But the Bush administration has continued to oppose all proposals for regulating greenhouse gas emissions. Because the United States has been the largest emitter of greenhouse
gases in the world, its continued refusal to agree to such controls
has provided convenient cover for developing countries to refuse
to adopt such controls. While China is now poised to pass the
United States as the largest emitter of greenhouse gases, it has
contributed a much smaller cumulative share of historical emissions and its per capita emissions are still only about one-ﬁfth
those of the United States.
As scientiﬁc evidence continues to mount that climate change
is occurring at an even more alarming rate than previously anticipated, U.S. opposition to mandatory controls on greenhouse gas
emissions has become an increasingly isolated position. In November 2007 Australian voters elected a new Prime Minister who
made ratiﬁcation of the Kyoto Protocol his ﬁrst priority. As a
result, at the most recent Conference of the Parties to the
UNFCCC, held in Bali in December 2007, the United States was
the only developed country that continued to oppose mandatory
controls on greenhouse gas emissions. U.S. environmentalists assured representatives from other countries that the U.S. position
would change after the presidential election of 2008, and they
noted that states containing more than 40 percent of the U.S.
population were adopting their own controls on greenhouse gas
emissions. The Supreme Court’s Massachusetts v EPA decision also
was cited as increasing the prospects for federal regulation in the
United States. The United States ultimately joined the other
nations of the world in adopting the “Bali Action Plan,” which
163
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recognizes “that deep cuts in global emissions will be required to
achieve the ultimate objective of the [UNFCCC]” and establishes
a process for negotiating a post-Kyoto control plan.164
Following the conclusion of the Bali conference, the U.S. Congress enacted compromise energy legislation that requires new
motor vehicles sold in the United States to achieve an average of
thirty miles per gallon by the year 2020, a 40 percent improvement
over current fuel economy standards.165 President Bush agreed to
sign the legislation, noting that he had endorsed a goal of reducing
U.S. gasoline consumption by 20 percent over the next decade
during his January 2007 State of the Union message.166 Hours
after President Bush signed the legislation on December 21, 2007,
EPA Administrator Steve Johnson stunned the states and the environmental community by announcing that he was denying California’s request for permission to put its controls on greenhouse
gas emissions from motor vehicles in effect, effectively vetoing
control schemes adopted by seventeen states.167 His action represented the ﬁrst time in the history of the Clean Air Act that
California had been denied approval to adopt an air pollution
control standard more stringent than the federal government. California’s ﬁfty previous waiver requests had been routinely granted.
Administrator Johnson argued that the new energy legislation
represented a “national approach to addressing the problem of
climate change” that would be preferable to a “patchwork” of state
standards. But the new energy legislation was never intended to
represent a national response to climate change. Its requirements
are not as stringent as the California plan, the adoption of which
could not create any “patchwork” because the Clean Air Act requires states other than California either to follow the national
standard or standards identical to the California plan. Johnson
argued that because of “the global nature of the problem of climate
change” California did not have a “need to meet compelling and
164
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extraordinary conditions,”168 quoting the statutory standard governing California waiver requests in § 209 of the Clean Air Act.
EPA’s action was widely denounced as arbitrary and capricious
and contrary to law. California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger
vowed to sue to overturn it.169 An editorial writer deemed it particularly hypocritical since EPA previously had praised California’s
program to control greenhouse gas emissions when reporting to
the international community on the nation’s progress in responding to climate change.170 It quickly leaked that EPA staff had opposed the decision and advised Administrator Johnson that it
would be overturned in court. The hasty announcement of the
decision and EPA’s tortured attempt to link it to the just-signed
energy legislation suggests that its rationale rests largely on political, rather than carefully considered legal grounds.
Through its decision in Massachusetts v EPA, the U.S. Supreme
Court brieﬂy joined the mounting global forces pushing for regulatory action to control emissions of greenhouse gases. While
the Bush administration’s policy has seriously jeopardized the difﬁcult quest for a collective global response to this critical problem,
actions by U.S. states to ﬁll the gap left by federal inaction have
provided some hope to the rest of the world. EPA’s decision to
veto state controls on emissions from motor vehicles represents a
severe setback, but one that may be quickly overturned in court.
IV. Conclusion
A century ago, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that it
had a duty to respond to states seeking relief from serious harm
caused by pollution originating outside their borders. In a series
of cases spanning several decades, the Court used the common
law of nuisance to issue injunctions limiting air pollution from
smelters and requiring cities to construct sewage treatment plants
and garbage incinerators and to stop practices that caused visible
environmental harm to neighboring states.171 The Court even168
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tually abandoned this role after Congress adopted comprehensive
regulatory programs to protect the environment. A key element
of nearly all these programs are citizen suit provisions designed
to ensure that the agencies charged with protecting public health
and the environment perform their duties in implementing and
enforcing the law.
Today the Court is badly split in its approach toward these
regulatory programs and the role of the judiciary in ensuring their
implementation. Four Justices recognize the importance of these
programs and the need for them to be able to adapt to newly
discovered environmental problems not fully anticipated when the
underlying regulatory legislation was adopted. Four other Justices
are openly hostile toward these programs and seek to limit their
reach by approaching them through the traditional paradigm of
private law litigation. The latter advocate narrow constructions of
the scope of federal regulatory authority and they seek to limit
the ability of citizens to enlist the judiciary in ensuring that agencies act in conformity to law. The man in the middle—Justice
Kennedy—straddles both camps. In Massachusetts v EPA he joined
the four Justices sympathetic to precautionary regulation to hold
that the Clean Air Act authorizes EPA to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions and to recognize the standing of states to force EPA to
reconsider its refusal to adopt such regulations. As a result, the
Court has now stepped in to nudge the executive to use its regulatory authority to respond to the most serious environmental
issue of our time.
While this decision is a landmark victory for environmentalists,
it also conﬁrms just how sharply divided the Court is on virtually
all aspects of its approach to regulatory policy. The Justices hostile
toward federal regulatory programs appear to be inﬂuenced by
common law notions that judicial intervention is unwarranted in
the absence of individualized proof of causal injury. Yet the inadequacies of the common law in protecting the environment were
a major reason why Congress adopted regulatory programs and
the comprehensiveness of these programs is the reason why the
Court found them to preempt federal common law.
Due to the enactment of comprehensive regulatory legislation,
the common law no longer serves as the ﬁrst line of defense for
public health and the environment. Instead, it functions largely as
a backstop to respond to problems not adequately dealt with by

3]

MASSACHUSETTS v EPA

159

precautionary regulation. The petition seeking EPA regulation of
greenhouse gases that was the focal point of the litigation in Massachusetts v EPA is only one of a series of legal initiatives to respond
to climate change. Because the United States has refused to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases, nuisance litigation has resurfaced as a vehicle for responding to this problem.
While the Court’s decision may help plaintiffs establish standing
premised on the harms caused by climate change, it is still unlikely
that nuisance litigation directed at this problem will be successful.
Unlike the harm caused by the copper smelters in Georgia v Tennessee Copper, the century-old precedent on which the Massachusetts
v EPA Court relied for its standing analysis, the causes and consequences of climate change are truly global in scope. Massachusetts
v EPA conﬁrms that it is not necessary to tackle the entire problem
at once in order to seek judicial redress. Its “every little bit helps”
approach is consistent with what the plaintiffs in Connecticut v
American Electric Power are seeking—modest reductions in emissions of greenhouse gases from the defendant utilities. Indeed, this
is essentially what the Supreme Court ultimately mandated in
Tennessee Copper—modest emissions reductions that did not
threaten the economic viability of the enterprises, but which
helped spur the development of new pollution control technology.172 Although the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Tennessee
Copper ultimately resulted in an injunction that limited emissions
from a copper smelter, the initial emissions limits were set at a
level that did not threaten the economic viability of the company.
But the threat of future liability and particularly the uncertainty
concerning the ultimate remedy to be applied by courts in abating
nuisances helped encourage the companies to develop new technology.
Like the litigation in Georgia v Tennessee Copper a century ago,
Massachusetts v EPA should spawn renewed efforts to confront a
widely acknowledged environmental problem that no court could
possibly hope to solve by itself. In the face of what many believe
to be the most widespread and serious environmental problem
humans face, the Court has taken a modest step to enter the
172
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vacuum left by executive inaction. Like its decision a century ago
in Tennessee Copper, the Court’s Massachusetts v EPA decision is a
victory for states seeking federal help to begin the long process
of combating a problem that extends beyond their jurisdiction.
With its decision in Massachusetts v EPA the Court returns in part
to the role it played in the early twentieth century by forcing
action, at the behest of a state, when no other federal institution
was responding to a serious environmental problem.
Massachusetts v EPA does not herald a new age of judicial activism
to protect the environment. The sharp dissents on standing and
the merits joined by the four dissenting Justices are a reminder
that the Supreme Court remains as sharply divided as humanly
possible on crucial issues of environmental law. By joining the
dissenting Justices in Massachusetts v EPA and the plurality in Rapanos the two newest members of the Court—Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Alito—conﬁrm that they, along with Justices Scalia and
Thomas, are highly skeptical of federal environmental regulation.
Their views on standing to sue in environmental cases clearly
represent a shift in a more restrictive direction away from the
views of the Laidlaw majority that included both of their predecessors, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor. Thus, for
now, the shadow cast by the common law approach to judicial
review of regulatory decisions has grown and the fate of most
environmental litigants before the Court remains ﬁrmly in the
hands of a single Justice—Justice Kennedy.
In Massachusetts v EPA the Court emerged from the growing
shadow of the common law paradigm to produce a truly remarkable decision. The decision, and the unusual efforts by U.S. states
to address a global problem, have rekindled hopes for the ultimate
development of a global consensus approach for responding to
climate change, despite the Bush administration’s continuing opposition. EPA’s decision to deny California’s request for approval
of its program of state controls indicates that careful judicial scrutiny of agency action must continue to ensure that the environmental laws are used appropriately in addressing the most serious
environmental problem of our time.

